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The purpose of this paper is to examine how the retailing sector responds to
globalization and, in particular, to the increased scope to import consumer
products. We are particularly interested in (i) the eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization on the structure and performance of the domestic retailing sector;
(ii) how the structure of retail markets aﬀects the transmission of external
shocks, such as changes in import prices, into domestic retail prices; and
(iii) how retail market regulation aﬀects market structure, imports and retail
prices. To study these issues we build a simple model of international trade
with heterogeneous retailers and endogenous markups. The model helps rec-
oncile the discrepancy between the low observed pass-through from import
into consumer prices and the seemingly large beneﬁt that consumers derive
from increasing import penetration.
The structure of retail markets has changed dramatically in recent decades.
Market concentration has increased markedly, driven by the emergence of
large national chains operating large establishments.1 This concentration
process has had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on international trade, as large retail-
ers increasingly import consumer goods from low-wage countries like China.
Basker and Van (2008b) for instance ﬁnd that over the period 1997 to 2002
U.S. imports from China and other less-developed countries rose especially
quickly in retail sectors with the largest consolidation into chains. Wal-Mart
alone accounts for 15% of total US imports from China (Basker and Van,
2008a).2 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States and is tak-
ing place in many retail segments, including electronics, computers, cameras,
housewares, toys, games, clothing, and footwear.3
1Whereas large retail ﬁrms (with at least 100 establishments) represented 18.6% of US
retail sales in 1967, their share has increased to 36.9% in 1997, and the average size of
these establishments is twice as large as it was 40 years ago. Overall, the retail and man-
ufacturing sectors have similar ratios of single to multi-unit ﬁrms but, not surprisingly,
multi-unit retailers operate more establishments on average than multi-unit manufactur-
ers. More signiﬁcantly, the number of establishments operated by multi-unit retailers has
increased dramatically between 1977 and 1997 whereas it has decreased in manufacturing
during the same period (Jarmin et al., 2005).
2Basker and Van (2008b) ﬁnd that between 1997 and 2002 the biggest US retailers had
a more than three times higher marginal propensity to import from China than smaller
retailers. They argue that the expansion of big retailers accounts for 19% of the growth
in US imports of consumer goods from China. On Wal Mart, see also Fishman (2006).
3For instance, in 2003, the share of imports in Canada was 55% for clothing, 82% for
1The paper is built on the idea that these changes in retail market structure
have in part been brought about by two ingredients: the increased scope to
import consumer goods from low-wage countries and economies of scale in
importing. In such an environment, reductions in import prices, whether due
to reductions in trade barriers or declining transportation and communication
costs, beneﬁt large retailers disproportionately, and by making large retailers
more competitive, lower import prices tend to squeeze out smaller retailers.
What makes this simple mechanism appealing is that, when imbedded
in a structural model of heterogenous retailers, it allows us to address sev-
eral important policy issues. First, the beneﬁts consumers may reap from
trade liberalization depend crucially on how changes in import prices are
passed through into consumer prices. Empirical evidence suggests that con-
sumer prices tend to react very little to movements in import prices; this
constitutes a major puzzle in international macroeconomics (Bacchetta and
van Wincoop, 2003). Recent research on this issue (Campa and Goldberg,
2006a, 2006b; Hellerstein, 2008) suggests that the retail sector plays a central
role in explaining pass-through, since distribution margins (i.e., retail costs
and retailer mark-ups) typically account for 30 to 50 percent of the retail
prices of consumer goods (Campa and Goldberg, 2006a). Any change in the
cost structure and competition of the retail sector thus has a large impact
on retail prices. By linking the pass-through of import prices into consumer
prices to a structural model of retail markets, we are able to shed new light
on this issue. Speciﬁcally, we decompose the degree of pass-through of im-
port prices into the average domestic retail price into several distinct eﬀects
including changes in distribution margins and in the import share. We show
that the degree of pass through into the average consumer price may be even
larger than the pass-through into the average retail price of imports.
Second, many countries, including France, Belgium, Italy, Japan and the
United Kingdom, are regulating retail markets, and in particular are limiting
the size of new retail establishments. Our model allows us to examine how
such regulations aﬀect retail market structure, imports, retail prices and
clothing accessories, 86% for footwear, 100% for audio, video, small electrical appliances,
as well as for toys and games (Jacobson, 2006, Table 33). It is precisely in these segments
that the market share of large Canadian retailers is the highest: the market shares of the
80 largest retailers in 2004 represented 61% for clothing and accessories, 68% for home
electronics, computers and cameras, 57% for housewares, 55% for toys and games and 49%
for food. On average, this share was 27% for all the products sold by Canadian retailers
(Jacobson, 2006, Table 6).
2ultimately welfare. This is especially interesting as there is evidence that,
in the United States, it is the relatively poor consumers who beneﬁt from
the existence of large retailers such as Wal-Mart and from the high volume
of non-durable products that these retailers import from China (Broda and
Romalis, 2008). In France, however, there is evidence that lower import
prices are not passed on to consumers, and consumers bitterly complain
about the lack of price competition at the retail level (Economist, 2008).
We show that retail regulations may indeed have strong negative eﬀects on
pass-through and welfare.
We investigate these issues in a model based on Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) who consider the selection of heterogeneous ﬁrms into export markets
in a model with endogenous markups. By contrast, in our model it is retailers
and thus importers that are heterogeneous. This modeling approach seems
especially relevant, since the entry and exit of ﬁrms have been an important
driving force behind the changes in retail market structure; in fact, both
rates have been much higher in retailing than in manufacturing (see Jarmin
et al., 2004).4
The basic mechanism at play in our model depends on large retailers
choosing to source a share of their goods directly fromabroad and not through
domestic sourcing (either by buying domestically produced goods or products
imported through independent intermediaries such as wholesalers or domes-
tic subsidiaries of foreign exporters). A recent survey of Austrian, German
and Swiss retailers (Zentes, Hilt and Domma, 2007) indicates that direct
importing is indeed mostly done by large retailers, the largest of which op-
erate their own overseas buying oﬃces.5 It also argues that direct importing
is associated with signiﬁcantly lower variable costs, as it allows retailers to
bypass additional layers of intermediaries through buying oﬃces that can
directly identify the lowest-cost supplier for speciﬁc items. The reason why
only big retailers choose the direct import channel is, of course, that it is asso-
ciated with large ﬁxed costs. These include costs of operating buying oﬃces,
4Moreover, according to Foster et al. (2006), productivity gains in retailing have been
due almost exclusively to the entry and exit process. Caves (1998) also reports that,
although entrants exhibit size heterogeneity at the time of entry, entry and exit are con-
centrated in the smallest size classes.
5Zentes, Hilt and Domma (2007) surveys 86 retailers in Germany, Austria and Switzer-
land (accounting for about 50% of total retail sales in the region). It shows that direct
imports by retailers accounted for 26-29% of total sourcing in 2006. Indirect imports
accounted for 35-37% of total sourcing and hence roughly half of total domestic sourcing.
3searching for suppliers, developing products, specifying product standards,
training suppliers, and monitoring quality.6 Evidence from Canadian retail-
ing also suggests that it is the large retailers that carry out the lion’s share
of direct importing. In NAICS 4481-83 (Clothing, Shoes, Jewellery, Luggage
and Leather Goods), for example, retail establishments with 50 employees or
more account for 76.3% of direct imports from low-cost Asian countries.7
Our paper is linked to the literature in the following way. Retail mar-
kets have been investigated by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) who show
that establishments tend to be larger in larger markets. They also suggest
that dispersion of establishment sizes is well approximated by a Pareto dis-
tribution. The role of international trade on retailers has been analyzed by
Basker and Van (2008a) who investigate the eﬀects of trade liberalization on
competition between a chain retailer and small single-market retailers. They
ﬁnd that trade liberalization raises the size of the chain retailer, and that
the growth of the chain gives an additional boost to imports. However, their
paper is silent about changes in the mass and size distribution of retailers,
pass-through, and about welfare eﬀects.
Other papers examining the interaction between trade liberalization and
retail market structure include Raﬀ and Schmitt (2008) who study the ef-
fects of trade liberalization in an oligopoly model with buyer power; Eckel
(2008) who examines the eﬀects of trade on retail market structure and espe-
cially on product diversity and accessibility of retailers; Francois and Wooton
(2008) who show that market structure in distribution becomes increasingly
important for trade as tariﬀs fall; and Richardson (2004) who studies mar-
ket access to retail distribution. Another related paper is by Javorcik, Keller
and Tybout (2006) who examines the eﬀect of NAFTA on the Mexican soaps,
detergents and surfactant industry. They argue that these eﬀects were less
due to the reduction in trade costs or to the entry of foreign manufacturers
6Buying oﬃces can indeed be quite large. For instance, KarstadtQuelle AG, Germany’s
biggest apparel and sixth-largest food retailer, operated 23 buying oﬃces with a total of
1,100 employees before re-organizing its direct importing business in 2006 (Zentes, Hilt and
Domma, 2007). Another survey (Foreign Trade Association, 2002, p. 9) of 23 European
apparel and textile retailers with combined turnover of around €138 billion cites the ”sheer
number of people involved, from Buying Departments to Sourcing Oﬃces to suppliers...who
need to exchange real time information...”
7The shares in NAICS sector 4431 (Electronics and Appliances), NAICS sector 4441
(Building Material and Supplies), and NAICS 4511-12 (Sporting Goods, Hobby, Musical
Instruments, Books, Periodicals, Music) are 68.2%, 64.1% and 67.6%, respectively. Source:
Statistics Canada, Import Register, Catalogue R007009, 2005.
4than to ‘the fundamental change in relationship’ between manufacturers and
retailers once Walmex (Wal-Mart of Mexico) entered the market.
In the pass-through literature the papers most closely related to ours are
by Hellerstein (2008) and Francois, Manchin and Norberg (2008). Heller-
stein bases her empirical study of pass-through on a model with Bertrand
oligopolies at both the manufacturing and retailing level. Like in our paper,
this set-up generates endogenous mark-ups. However, unlike in our model,
market structure remains ﬁxed. Francois, Manchin and Norberg also work
in an oligopoly framework but with representative ﬁrms and empirically ex-
amine pass-through of tariﬀ and exchange-rate changes into producer and
consumer prices using EU data.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) discuss the eﬀects of retail market regu-
lation in France, while Haskel and Sadun (2009) study the eﬀect of regula-
tion on the productivity of UK retailing. Schivardi and Viviano (2008) and
Miyagiwa (1993) examine the impact of retail market regulations in Italy
and Japan, respectively. Except for the latter paper, this literature is not
concerned with the eﬀects of regulations on international trade. Miyagiwa
(1993) does not consider market structure eﬀects of retail regulations.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model
of international trade with heterogeneous retailers. The equilibria of the
model and comparative static results for marginal changes in trade costs are
derived in Section 3. In Section 4 we use the model to study the pass-through
of import prices into retail prices and the eﬀect of retail market regulation.
In Section 5 we use simulations to assess the impact of trade liberalization on
retailer concentration and social welfare both for the case with and without
retail market regulation. Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix contains
proofs.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a simple model of a retailing sector that sources
the goods it distributes both domestically and abroad. There is a continuum
of retailers selling only in their domestic market (their services are non-
traded). From the consumer’s point of view, the products sold by diﬀerent
retailers are diﬀerentiated varieties. This could be because each retailer sells
a diﬀerent bundle of goods, or because the retailers themselves are diﬀerenti-
ated. Retailer diﬀerentiation occurs when consumers value diﬀerent retailer
5characteristics, such as location or customer services. It is more natural to
interpret our model as one of retailer diﬀerentiation. We index retailers by



























i denotes the quantity per capita bought from retailer i, and y the
consumption of the numeraire good. Parameter β describes the degree of sub-
stitutability between retailers. If β = 0, retailers are perfectly substitutable,




The degree of diﬀerentiation between retailers increases with β.
Assuming that the demand for the numeraire product is positive, the
inverse per-capita demand faced by each retailer i is




Denoting by L the number of consumers and by N the mass of active retailers,
the market demand faced by retailer i can be expressed as a function of the














  p, (3)
where






and where  ∗ is the set of active retailers.
Labor, the only factor of production, is inelastically supplied and per-
fectly mobile between the production and the retailing sectors. Since the
numeraire good is produced by a competitive industry under constant re-
turns technology and a unit labor requirement of one, the price of labor in
the economy is also equal to one. All costs are therefore expressed in terms
of labor requirements.
We assume that retailers ﬁrst decide wether to enter the market and thus
whether to incur the sunk cost FE. Upon entering, each retailer learns about
its speciﬁc level of marginal retailing cost c or, equivalently, its productivity
1/c. We assume that the distribution of c is given by G(c) with support
on [0,cM]. Since the entry cost is sunk, only entrants able to cover their
marginal cost are active in the market. All remaining entrants are inactive,
6i.e., do not buy or sell any goods. Assuming that retail productivity follows






where k ≥ 1. When k = 1, the distribution is uniform on [0,cM]. As k
increases, the distribution shifts toward high marginal costs.
Once a retailer has entered the market, he has to decide whether to source
goods domestically or to import them. Imports involve a per-unit trade cost
t and a ﬁxed cost FI. This ﬁxed cost includes the cost of maintaining buying
oﬃces, cooperating with foreign partners to source goods, acquiring informa-
tion, etc. Production (domestic or foreign) involves no ﬁxed or sunk cost but
foreign production is assumed to be cheaper than domestic production. For
simplicity, we normalize the marginal cost of foreign producers to zero, and
denote the marginal cost of domestic production by w > 0.
Hence, active retailers that buy domestically maximize
(pi − c − w)qi(pi), (4)
whereas active retailers relying on imports maximize
(pi − c − t)qi(pi) − FI. (5)
Below we let superscript D indicate domestic sourcing, and I indicate im-
ports.8
Taking the mass of active retailers N and average retail price   p as given
when setting theirprice, it is easy to check that the proﬁt-maximizing markups
8We may also interpret the good sold by retailers as a composite consumer good q
that consists of a domestic good (z), and a good (m) that may either be imported or
sourced domestically. Equations (4) and (5) and the rest of the analysis are unchanged if
one makes the following assumptions. Let goods z and m be aggregated according to the
following CES function q = (zφ + mφ)
1
φ with 0 < φ < 1; z and m are hence imperfect
substitutes with an elasticity of substitution equal to σ = 1/(1 − φ). Let the marginal
cost of z be equal to one. A retailer can source good m in two ways: First, he may buy it
domestically at price ω; this is mode D. Second, the retailer may choose direct importing.
This strategy involves a ﬁxed cost of importing, FI, and a variable cost (including the
























i ) and (p
I














c + w +









c + t +






γN+β − w, the equilibrium prices and outputs of a retailer
with marginal cost c are
p
D(c) = w +
1
2



























(cD + w − c − t)
2 − FE − FI. (11)
Only retailers with marginal costs less than or equal to cD will remain
active, because only they will be able to cover their marginal cost. Active
retailers have to select from which source to buy their goods. A retailer is
indiﬀerent between domestic sourcing and direct imports if πD(c) = πI(c)
This condition deﬁnes a critical value of the marginal cost cI,







such that ﬁrms with c ≤ cI prefer imports and ﬁrms with c > cI domestic
sourcing. We assume that cI ≤ cD so that the least eﬃcient active retailers




2 ≤ FI. (13)
8We also assume that importing is more proﬁtable for the most eﬃcient re-






2 + 2cD(w − t)
 
. (14)
These two assumptions togetherwith the quadratic formof the proﬁt function
ensure that the value of cI solving (12) is unique.
The two cut-oﬀ values of the marginal cost, cD and cI, deﬁne three cate-
gories of retailers. Retailers whose marginal cost is suﬃciently small (c ≤ cI)
import; retailers whose marginal costs are in the middle range (cI < c ≤ cD)
source goods domestically; and retailers with high marginal costs (c > cD)
are not active because they are not able to cover their marginal costs.















Since the marginal active retailer is just indiﬀerent between buying and not
buying, we have qD(cD) = 0 and pD(cD) = w + cD. Using this price in (3),
the mass of active retailers can be calculated as
N =
β(α − w − cD)
γ(w + cD −   p)
. (16)
The mass of active retailers is related to the mass of entrants into the
retail market, NE, by the condition N = NEG(cD). In equilibrium the mass












(−FE)dG(c) = 0. (17)
3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the model and examine
the comparative statics with regard to changes in the trade cost t. The
endogenous variables of the model are p, cD, cI and N. The equilibrium
values of these variables are given by equations (12), (15), (16) and (17).
9Consider ﬁrst the zero-proﬁt condition (17). The partial derivative of
this condition with respect to cI is zero since, by deﬁnition, πI(cI) = πD(cI).
Total diﬀerentiation of this equation hence yields dcD/dt. We can then derive
dcI/dt from (12), and the marginal change in p from (15).
We obtain the following comparative static results:
Proposition 1 Trade liberalization (i) forces the least eﬃcient retailers to
become inactive (cD decreases); (ii) induces some retailers to switch to buying
imports (cI rises); and (iii) reduces the average consumer price p.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for these eﬀects is as follows. A reduction in the trade cost,
ceteris paribus, raises the proﬁts of importers both in absolute terms and
relative to those retailers that source their goods domestically. Hence more
retailers will turn to imports (cI rises). To keep the zero-proﬁt condition
satisﬁed ex ante despite the fact that active retailers will ex post earn a
larger proﬁt, cD has to decrease so as to lower the probability of being an
active retailer.
To explain the eﬀect on p we apply the Pareto distribution to (15), which
yields














The four terms of this expression have a natural interpretation: the ﬁrst
term is, of course, the marginal cost of domestic production; the second




0 cdG(c)); the third term is the expected markup of retailers sourc-






c)dG(c)); and the last term is equal to the fraction of cost savings from im-
ports that is passed on to consumers, (w − t)/2, times the probability of
being an importer conditional on c < cD.
A reduction in t directly aﬀects the last term in (18): there are greater
savings from imports relative to domestic sourcing, and the probability of
importing rises. Indirect eﬀects arise as trade liberalization eliminates the
least eﬃcient retailers. As can be seen from the second and third terms in
(18), a decrease in t lowers the expected marginal retail cost, and reduces
the mark-up of retailers buying goods domestically.
Since the retail sector is imperfectly competitive, retailers that source
their goods from abroad pass only part of the reduction in trade costs on to
10consumers. Their mark-ups, sales and proﬁts hence rise. Retailers that buy
their goods domestically, on the other hand, are forced to cut their mark-ups,
which leads to lower sales and proﬁts. These eﬀects can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization (i) lowers the sales, mark-ups and proﬁts
of retailers that source domestically; (ii) raises the sales, mark-ups and proﬁts
of retailers that engage in direct imports.
Proof: see Appendix.
Firms respond to changes in expected proﬁts by entering or exiting the
retail sector. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that trade liberalization indeed
induces changes in expected proﬁts. First, since trade liberalization reduces
cD, the likelihood of earning a positive operating proﬁt, G(cD), falls. Sec-
ond, the proﬁt earned by an importer rises and, since cI goes up, so does
the probability of being an importer. Third, the proﬁt of a retailer buying
goods domestically decreases, but so does the probability of falling into this
category.
We can use (16) to derive how the mass of active ﬁrms N changes with
marginal changes in t, keeping in mind that N is related to the equilibrium















The ﬁrst expression in parentheses represents the cost eﬀect: a fall in t
reduces the average retail cost and thus implies a higher number of active
retailers. The second expression represents the price eﬀect: a decrease in
t reduces the average retail price, which drives down the number of active
retailers. The sign of dN
dt is therefore generally ambiguous, that is, it depends
very much on the characteristics of the retail sector. However, we can prove:
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization reduces the mass of active retailers if the
ﬁxed cost of importing is suﬃciently small and the market (as measured by
α) is suﬃciently big.
Proof: see Appendix.
Before studying pass-through and the impact of regulation, it is important
to point out that the analysis above does not only apply in the long run when
11there is free entry and exit of retailers, but also in the short run when NE is
ﬁxed. The reason is that the selection eﬀect also works in the short run as
retailers can very quickly add or drop product lines (i.e. become active or
inactive), or change their sourcing strategies.
In the short run, the equilibrium values of p, cD and cI are given by
Equations (15), (12) and (16), where in the latter equation we substitute for
N using N = NEG(cD). We show in the Appendix that the eﬀect of t on the
equilibrium values of these variables is qualitatively the same as in the long
run when free entry and exit drive expected retail proﬁts to zero.
4 Pass-Through and Retail Market Regula-
tion
Our model of retail market structure is admittedly highly stylized. However,
it is precisely its simplicity that allows us to investigate two issues in which
the structure of retail markets plays a key role. The ﬁrst issue concerns the
pass-through of import prices into retail prices. We want to show that pass-
through may be high if one takes into account that retailers may switch the
sourcing of their goods. The second issue concerns the eﬀects of retail-market
regulations, such as limits on the size of retail establishments as traditionally
imposed in France, Belgium, Japan, Italy, the U.K. and elsewhere. We will
show that such regulations tend to raise average retail prices and reduce
pass-through.
4.1 Pass-Through of Import into Retail Prices
The pass-through of changes in the import price t into the average retail
price p can be studied using (18). As is evident from this equation, changes
in t have a direct eﬀect on p, as well as indirect eﬀects through changes in
the equilibrium values of cD and cI. Speciﬁcally, the pass-through rate for








































The ﬁrst term is the standard pass-through eﬀect: the share of direct cost
savings that an importer passes on to consumers (1/2) times the probability
12that a good is being imported. This eﬀect is clearly less than one and may
be very small if the probability that a good is imported (or, equivalently,
the share of imports in the consumption basket) is small. This probability
depends in a straightforward way on the trade cost. It also depends on the
distribution of retailing costs as summarized by parameter k.
The last three terms in (20) reﬂect the fact that trade liberalization (i)
changes retailing costs and retail markups as the least eﬃcient retailers be-
come inactive, and (ii) increases the likelihood that a good is being sourced
from abroad. Speciﬁcally, the second term reﬂects the fact that a reduction
in t lowers the expected unit cost of retailing. The third term indicates that
a lower t reduces the markup of domestically sourced goods. The fourth
term shows that trade liberalization, by raising the probability of importing,
generates cost savings from importing for a bigger share of the consumption
basket.
Since the last three eﬀects are positive, the pass-through rate may be big
even if the ﬁrst term is small. How big it is depends in part on the level of
trade cost. We are able to show the following surprising result:
Proposition 4 The rate of pass-through of import prices into the average
retail price may exceed unity.
Proof: see Appendix.
The proof of the proposition shows that a suﬃcient condition for this
result to hold is that there is a large enough proportion of retailers that source
their goods from abroad (e.g., a suﬃciently low ﬁxed cost of importing). This
result demonstrates that an analysis of pass-through that is limited to the
standard eﬀect, i.e., the share of cost savings that retailers sourcing goods
from abroad pass on to consumers times the import share in the retail sector,
may severely underestimate the actual pass-through.
It is important to notice that Proposition 4 is not inconsistent with rela-
tively low rates of pass-through with respect to either the average retail price
of imported products, pI, or the average retail price of domestic products,
pD. To see this, note that a change in t has a larger impact on the average
retail price of imported products than on the average retail price of domestic
products (i.e., dpI/dt > dpD/dt). Simply, the latter price reacts indirectly
because of the competition among retailers, while the former price also reacts
directly to a change in t. But how do these two rates compare to the pass-
through rate with respect to the average retail price, dp/dt? Interestingly,
13in our model we have dp/dt > dpI/dt > dpD/dt at least for low values of t
because the change in the composition of products (imported versus domes-
tic) is taken into account in the ﬁrst rate but not in the two others. Figure
1 illustrates the point. It represents the retail price of imports (over [0,cI])
and the retail price of the domestic products (over [cI,cD]) given an arbitrary
value of t. As trade is liberalized, the retail price of imports falls and some
retailers switch from domestic to foreign sourcing (cI rises to c
′
I), while some
small retailers selling domestic products become inactive (cD falls to c
′
D). By
deﬁnition, the pass-through rate with respect to the average retail price of
imports depends on how the average retail price over the new set of imports
changes relative to the average retail price over the initial set of imports.
Similarly for the pass-through rate with respect to the average retail price
of domestic products. There is no reason why these rates should be large as
higher-cost retailers are added to the existing mix of ﬁrms selling imports,
while lower-cost retailers (but also some higher-cost retailers) are dropped
from the mass of ﬁrms selling domestic products. By also including the
switch in sourcing from domestic products to imports, and thus signiﬁcant
decreases in retail prices over the interval A-B in Figure 1, the pass-through
rate for the average retail price is higher than the one for imports and domes-
tic products. It is, in fact, easy to ﬁnd examples where the pass-through rate
for the average retail price is above one but where the pass-through rates for
the average retail price of domestic and for foreign products are both below
one. This also implies that Proposition 4 is not inconsistent with existing
results (see, for instance Campa and Goldberg, 2006b, Table 5).
The fact that an overall pass-through rate greater than one is not in-
consistent with pass-through rates with respect to retail prices of imported
and domestic products that are lower than one points to the importance of
including changes in retail costs and markups spurred by the elimination of
ineﬃcient retailers and the increase in foreign sourcing into the computation
of the pass-through rate. Only if one takes into account these key adjustment
and composition eﬀects associated with a change in trade costs (or more gen-
erally permanent external shocks) does one obtain an unbiased estimate of
the pass-through rate. Interestingly, this also indicates that there may not
be inconsistencies between low observed pass-through rates and signiﬁcant
impacts on consumers from import penetration.
144.2 Retail-Market Regulation
A regulation limiting the size of retail establishments only aﬀects the very
eﬃcient retailers. In eﬀect, such a regulation can be thought of as putting
an upper bound on their sales. Suppose the maximum level of sales allowed
under the regulation is given by ˆ q. Using ˆ q in (3) and the deﬁnition of cD,
we obtain the price charged by a constrained ﬁrm, ˆ p, as




Assuming that the marginal ﬁrm that is just constrained in its sales is an
importer, we can write the proﬁt of a constrained ﬁrm as
ˆ π(c) =
 
cD + w −
β
L
ˆ q − c − t
 
ˆ q − FE − FI. (22)
The critical value of the marginal cost ˆ c at which a ﬁrm is just constrained
is deﬁned by ˆ q ≡ qI(ˆ c). Hence




At this level of marginal cost we have ˆ π(ˆ c) = πI(ˆ c).
Ceteris paribus, a tightening of the constraint raises ˆ c, which implies that
the sales constraint hits even less eﬃcient ﬁrms. Of course a change in ˆ q also
aﬀects the other critical levels of the marginal cost, i.e., cD and cI, together
with the other endogenous variables, p and NE. The long-term equilibrium
values of the endogenous variables when the constraint is binding are given
by equations (16), (12) and (23), as well as the new expected-zero-proﬁt
condition
































To derive the comparative static eﬀects of a marginal change in the
constraint ˆ q, consider again the zero-proﬁt condition. Since, by deﬁnition,
15ˆ π(ˆ c) = πI(ˆ c) and πI(cI) = πD(cI), the partial derivatives of (24) with re-
spect to ˆ c and cI are zero. We therefore directly obtain from (24) the change
in cD for marginal changes in ˆ q. The respective changes in ˆ c and cI then
follow directly from (23) and (12). The following proposition presents these
comparative-static eﬀects:
Proposition 5 A tightening of the sales constraint   q: (i) allows less eﬃcient
retailers to become active (cD rises); (ii) reduces the sales of more eﬃcient
retailers (ˆ c rises); and (iii) induces some retailers to source goods from abroad
(cI rises).
Proof: see Appendix.
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition are straightforward. A tighter con-
straint on the sales of the most eﬃcient retailers raises the residual demand
for the unconstrained retailers. This allows the least eﬃcient retailers to re-
main in business. The surprising result is in part (iii), namely that a tighter
sales constraint raises retailers’ propensity to import. The reason for this
is that the higher residual demand allows retailers that before were too in-
eﬃcient to import to source their goods from abroad. This increase at the
extensive margin of imports is, of course, oﬀset by a decrease at the intensive
margin: a tighter constraint reduces the import volume of eﬃcient retailers.
To determine the eﬀect of a tighter constraint on the average retail price,
we simplify (25) to obtain




















This ﬁrst four terms of this equation are the same as in (18). The ﬁfth term
is an additional term reﬂecting the direct eﬀect of the output constraint.
It represents the extra expected markup of a constrained ﬁrm times the
probability that a ﬁrm is constrained conditional on its cost being less than
cD.
The change in the average retail price induced by a tighter constraint
comes from changes in the cut-oﬀ values ˆ c, cD and cI. A tighter ˆ q raises all
three cut-oﬀ values. This has the following implications. An increase in ˆ c
means that a larger fraction of retailers becomes constrained and thus has
higher prices than without the constraint. The increase in cD also raises ˆ p,
since at the margin less eﬃcient retailers remain active in the market. The
16rise in cI works against the ﬁrst two eﬀects. Retailers are more likely to
source goods from abroad, which is associated with lower variable costs than
sourcing goods domestically. One would expect that the ﬁrst two eﬀects
dominate the last one, so that a tightening of the sales constraint raises the
average retail price. Formally, we can show that it is indeed the case if either
w−t is big and/or FI is small so that the retailers switching to importing have
a relatively high unit retailing cost compared with the rest of the industry
and thus have only a small market share.
We formally state these suﬃcient conditions in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 A tightening of the sales constraint   q raises the average retail
price ˆ p if w − t is suﬃciently big and/or FI is suﬃciently small.
Proof: see Appendix.
Retail-market regulation also aﬀects the pass-through of import into con-
sumer prices. As can be seen in (21), the prices of constrained retailers are
not aﬀected at all by the import price, even though we assumed that these
retailers do in fact import their goods. The reason for this is that the sales
of these ﬁrms are below the level at which marginal revenue equals marginal
cost, so that small changes in marginal cost have no eﬀect on sales or prices.
In the extreme case where the constraint is so restrictive that it aﬀects
all importing ﬁrms, the pass-through into the average retail price is therefore
zero even if the import share in the total consumption basket of households
is large. It follows that for a suﬃciently tight constraint, i.e., for   q suﬃciently
close to qI(cI), the pass-through rate will be lower than without the regula-
tion. Thus, even if retail-market regulation induces a larger mass of retailers
to source from abroad, its impact on the most eﬃcient retailers makes the
average retail price less sensitive to variations in import prices. This result
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7 Retail-market regulation reduces the rate of pass-through of
import prices into the average retail price if the output constraint is suﬃ-
ciently tight.
5 Retail Market Concentration and Welfare
In this section we use simulations to illustrate how trade liberalization im-
pacts social welfare, as well as retail concentration and pass through.
17In the context of the present model, the Herﬁndahl index, H, is an ideal
measure of market concentration. This is because this index takes into ac-
count the entire size distribution of the retailing sector and thus both the
mass of active retailers as well as the dispersion of retailer size. Indeed, the
Herﬁndahl index, deﬁned as the sum of the squares of all retailers’ market
shares, can be re-written as (see Waterson, 1984)
H =
σ2
q/  q2 + 1
N
, (27)
where   q denotes average sales of active retailers and σ2
q is the variance of
retail sales. This formulation of H reveals the separate eﬀects on concentra-
tion stemming from the mass of retailers and from the impact of retailers’
heterogeneity. Thus, in a market with heterogeneous ﬁrms, market concen-
tration as measured by the Herﬁndahl index is negatively related to the mass
of active retailers, N, and positively related to the coeﬃcient of variation of
retail sales, σq/  q. Since 0 ≤ H ≤ 1, industry concentration is high if a few
big retailers account for a large fraction of sales.
Another advantage of H is that it can be used for policy purposes, be
it for competition policy or market regulation. For example, the purpose of
the retail regulations analyzed in the previous section can be interpreted as
controlling retail concentration and thus reaching a lower value of H than
market forces alone would generate.
In addition to measuring concentration, we also want to evaluate social
welfare. Social welfare in the current model is captured by the following
indirect utility function (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008):


















p denotes the variance of retail prices. Welfare is obviously decreasing
in   p and increasing in N and σ2
p.
It is often presumed that if an exogenous shock such as trade liberalization
occurs, then H should fall and U increase. This presumption rests on the
idea that a decrease in H is associated with an increase in competition and
thus with a smaller social deadweight loss. It is easy to see that such a
simple one-to-one relationship between H and U does not necessarily exist
in the present model. Even if it is the case that an increase in N raises
U and decreases H, heterogeneity also plays an important role. Observe in
18particular that H and U are increasing in σ2
q and σ2
p, respectively. Thus if
dσ2
q/dt and dσ2
p/dt are both positive, trade liberalization reduces σ2
q and H,
and it also reduces σ2
p and U, holding ﬁxed the values of the other endogenous
variables. In the Appendix, we show that dσ2
q/dt and dσ2
p/dt are indeed
both positive, at least when FI is small. Thus, unless trade liberalization
changes the mass of retailers in a way that clearly dominates its eﬀects on
the size variation of retailers, it is quite possible that social welfare may
increase, even if liberalization increases retail market concentration. Clearly,
retailer heterogeneity plays a key role in this seemingly contradictory message
provided by H and by social welfare.
Table 1 illustrates this case. Both welfare (measured by U net of income
I) and H monotonically rise with trade liberalization. Note that welfare
increases despite a decrease in the number of active retailers, N.9 This
occurs because the average price, p, falls a lot as trade costs come down.
This is shown by the last column of Table 1 where the degree of pass through
is greater than one, except when t is high. This decrease in N naturally
contributes to explain why H rises with trade liberalization, but so is the
increase in the variance of sales, σ2
q, and thus the degree of heterogeneity
among retailers.
Table 1: (L = 5, FE = .02, FI = .1, w = .25, cM = 5, α = 1.75, β = .9,
γ = .6, k = 1)
t cD cI p N σ2
q H U − I dp/dt
0 .44 .42 .46 6.95 .62 .2 1.16 1.52
.05 .49 .41 .53 7.38 .51 .19 1.07 1.41
.1 .54 .37 .60 7.78 .48 .18 .97 1.3
.15 .58 .27 .66 8.22 .36 .17 .89 1.12
.19 .6 .03 .7 8.92 .25 .15 .83 .62
Simulations are also useful to show the eﬀects of market regulation. We
use as a benchmark a case in which, in the absence of any regulation, trade
liberalization monotonically raises U and lowers H . Table 2 illustrates this
case for a parameter space identical to the one above except that now FE = .1.
9And despite a small decrease in σ2
p for t ≤ .15 (not shown in Table 1).
19Table 2:
t cD cI p N σ2
q H U − I dp/dt
0 .83 .82 .75 3.02 .96 .43 .58 1.4
.05 .88 .8 .82 2.96 .9 .44 .51 1.35
.1 .93 .77 .89 2.88 .86 .46 .45 1.3
.15 .98 .67 .95 2.78 .84 .48 .39 1.22
.2 1.02 .33 1.01 2.73 .76 .5 .33 .93
Suppose now that a regulation is in place that restricts the size of the
most eﬃcient retailers. Speciﬁcally, the most eﬃcient retailer (with c = 0)
cannot have a volume of sales greater than 75% of its unconstrained free-
trade volume. In the above example, this corresponds to a maximum sales
volume allowed by regulation equal to   qI(c = t = 0) = 1.83. Of course, such
a constraint aﬀects more than just the most eﬃcient retailers but it does so
with a smaller relative impact, since less eﬃcient retailers are smaller. Indeed,
retailers with a volume of sales less than   qI(c) = 1.83 are not aﬀected at all.
Table 3 shows the percentage changes with respect to the benchmark case
without regulation and thus with respect to Table 2 (except for cD and cI,
for which we present levels).
Table 3:
t cD cI   p   q N H U − I d  p/dt
0 .86 .84 +11% -16% +14% -28% -14% -44%
.05 .91 .83 +9% -16% +13% -22% -15% -41%
.1 .96 .8 +8% -16% +13% -19% -16% -39%
.15 1.0 .7 +7% -15% +12% -17% -17% -43%
.2 1.04 .35 +6% -15% +11% -16% -17% -85%
The regulation has striking eﬀects, especially regarding the impact of
trade liberalization. It signiﬁcantly increases the number of active retailers
and decreases H relative to the benchmark case. In this sense, the intro-
duction of the regulation is a very successful policy. However, even if trade
liberalization still leads to lower prices and a greater average volume of sales,
the impact of freer trade is very much muted since the average price decreases
to a much smaller extent and the average quantity sold by retailers increases
much less than without the regulation. As already argued, this implies that
the rate of pass through is much lower. Indeed it is now much lower than one
and, in this example, more than 40% lower than without any regulation. As
20can be observed in the last column of Table 3, the rate of pass-through de-
creases even more for relatively high levels of t. This is because pass-through
quickly converges to zero for high levels of t. Indeed, the rate of pass-through
is necessarily equal to zero whenever all the retailers who choose to source
their product from abroad are constrained by the regulation. The overall
impact of the regulation is a much smaller increase in social welfare through
trade liberalization than in the absence of such a regulation. Based on this
example, it may not be very surprising that French consumers complain that
they do not beneﬁt from trade liberalization.
These simulations should be taken as illustrative but they show force-
fully that one should be careful before using concentration indices such as
the Herﬁndahl index in the presence of heterogeneous retailers as there is
no simple one-to-one relationship between such an index and social welfare.
This point is best illustrated by the case of regulation. While it may have
achieved its objective by increasing the number of retailers and lowering H,
it does not deliver in terms of social welfare because it mitigates competition
and diminishes the impact of trade liberalization, especially the rate of pass
through.
6 Conclusions
By focusing on retailers’ total volume of sales, our model is highly stylized.
However, it is precisely its simplicity that allows us to investigate how trade
liberalization changes the structure of the retailing industry when retailers
are heterogeneous. Because buying foreign products involves a ﬁxed cost,
only the most eﬃcient retailers source goods from abroad. Trade liberal-
ization is then shown to shift retail sales, mark-ups and proﬁts toward big
retailers that engage in direct imports and away from small ones that source
domestically only. The consequences for retail market concentration, as mea-
sured by the Herﬁndahl Index, are ambiguous, however. If the ﬁxed cost of
direct imports is suﬃciently small, trade liberalization raises the mean and
reduces the variance of retail sales, which by itself lowers concentration; it
also decreases the number of active retailers, which raises market concentra-
tion. The ambiguous eﬀect of trade liberalization on market concentration
carries over into social welfare, as the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the decrease in the
average retail price is at least partly oﬀset by a fall in the number of retailers.
The model provides clear predictions concerning the sensitivity of re-
21tail prices to variations in import prices and thus about the degree of pass-
through at the retail level. It suggests that retailer heterogeneity plays an im-
portant role in explaining the degree of pass-through. Speciﬁcally, the model
predicts that the rate of pass-through into consumer prices may be quite
high, even exceeding unity when the ﬁxed cost of importing is small. This
is consistent with the existing studies on import-price pass-through, which
ﬁnd that pass-through is incomplete and often small. The reason simply is
that changes in import prices trigger changes in the mass of active retailers
and in sourcing decisions that lead to discrete jumps in the consumer prices
of the aﬀected retailers. When this is taken into account, the pass-through
into the average consumer price may even exceed the pass-through into the
average retail price of imports. This result is interesting because it suggests
that there may not be an inconsistency between low observed pass-through
rates and signiﬁcant impacts on consumers from import penetration.
The model also shows that the pass-through increases when trade barriers
fall. This eﬀect has two sources: (i) a direct eﬀect that leads retailers to
import more when trade costs decrease and which naturally makes the retail
prices more sensitive to changes in the trade barrier; and (ii) an indirect
eﬀect that comes from the fact that the average unit retailing cost falls as less
eﬃcient retailers become inactive or exit the market. Thus the importance
of domestic retailing costs, an element that tends to isolate domestic prices
from foreign inﬂuences, falls as well. The sensitivity of the retail prices also
depends very much on the characteristics of the retail sector. Thus if some of
these characteristics also change with trade liberalization (for instance, due
to technological innovation), the rate of pass-through may well increase even
more. These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence presented,
for instance, by Campa and Goldberg (2006b), and Campa and González
Minguez (2006). The former paper ﬁnds that the retail price sensitivity to
import price variations has generally increased over the last decade, but that
the degree of sensitivity is very much product speciﬁc. The latter shows that
diﬀerences in pass-through rates within the Euro area are driven mainly by
diﬀerences in openness to non-Euro-area imports.
Finally, the model is also well suited to understand the impact of restric-
tions on the size of retailers. In countries like France, Belgium or Japan,
there is a tradition of protecting small local retailers by placing barriers on
the expansion and particularly on the size of large retailers. Not surprisingly,
restrictions on the volume of sales aﬀect ﬁrst and foremost the eﬃcient retail-
ers. We show that this allows ineﬃcient retailers to remain active and makes
22the average retail price higher than it would otherwise be. Interestingly this
makes the incentives to source products from abroad stronger for less eﬃcient
retailers, not weaker. We also show that it makes the retail price level less
sensitive to changes in the price of imported products. With higher average
retail prices and a lower sensitivity of retail prices to foreign shocks, it should
not be surprising if French consumers feel that their ‘pouvoir d’achat’ (pur-
chasing power) has suﬀered as compared to consumers elsewhere in Europe
(Economist, 2008).
The contrast with the United States is striking. Broda and Romalis
(2008) show that because poor US households have a diﬀerent composition
of their consumption basket than rich households and because the price index
of the poor’s consumption basket has declined relative to that of the rich, the
impact of the rise in income inequality has been signiﬁcantly smaller than
ﬁrst feared. One thing is certain, this would not have been possible without
the instrumental role played by large retailers importing a large volume of
products from low-cost Asian countries.
These two examples underline well the signiﬁcant impact of the retailing
sector in a more integrated world. Simply put, in the United States, the
large retailers seem to allow poor consumers to keep up with the Joneses
whereas in France consumers feel cheated by the retailers and do not perceive
much beneﬁt from globalization. Of course much more needs to be done to
understand the role and the impact of the retailing sector in today’s world.
This is left for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1

















































D(w +cD −p) > 0 and w −t+cD −
kcI
k+1 > 0 due
to w > t, cD > cI and k < 1 + k.
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dt < 0 provided c
1+k
D (w − t + cD − cI) > (w − t)c
1+k
I which holds
since w > t and cD > cI.




































since all the terms on the RHS are positive.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Diﬀerentiating (8) and (10) with respect to t and using (30), it is easy to


















Next, we show that
dcD




(1 + k)(w − t) + cD + k(cD − cI)























k = 1, this inequality reduces to (cD − cI)2 > 0, and when k > 1, the RHS
of the above inequality increases faster than the LHS. Since 0 <
dcD
dt < 1, it
























7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
After substituting for p and
dp


















































For FI equal to its lower bound (see (13)), we have cD = cI,
dcI
dt = 0, and
dcD





























= sign{k(α − w − cD) − cD}.





> 0 if α is suﬃciently
big.
7.4 Comparative Statics for the Short Run
























β(α − w − cD)















































The value of the determinant is given by |D| = −a11 (a32 + a33) +a12. After
some algebraic manipulation we can show that
|D| = −
β(α − w − cD)






























































           
=
a12b2 − a11b3 − a11a32b2
|D|
< 0,
since |D| < 0, and after some algebraic transformations
a12b2 − a11b3 − a11a32b2
=
β(α − w − cD)





















γ(w + cD − p)
> 0.
In the short run, the pass-through rate with respect to the average retail
price is also given by (20); it is also easy to ﬁnd examples for which the
short-term pass-through rate is greater than one.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
When cD = cI,
dcI
dt = 0 and
dcD
dt = 1 (and thus when FI is near its lower










By continuity, dp/dt > 1 for FI greater but suﬃciently close its lower bound.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5











(k+1) + (w − t)ck
I
  < 0. (41)
















7.7 Proof of Proposition 6






































dˆ q < 0 and cD(1 + k) − kˆ c > 0, we have
d￿ p
dˆ q < 0 if the second term is
suﬃciently small. Using (12), the second term can be written as:





























dˆ q < 0 provided that FI is small and/or (w − t) is big enough.
7.8 Average Sales and Variance of Sales
The average sales volume of active retailers is given by

















































For FI = 0, we have cD = cI,
dcI
dt = 0, and
dcD
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(k + 2)(k + 1)2 > 0.
By continuity we have d  q/dt < 0 and dσ2
q/dt > 0 for FI suﬃciently close to
zero.
7.9 Variance of Retail Prices































The proof that dσ2
p/dt > 0 for FI suﬃciently close to zero is identical to the
one for dσ2
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